Technofixes are technological solutions to problems (Harvey, 2003a). They are based on the belief known as 'technological solutionism' (Morozov, 2013), which is the idea that social and ecological problems can be solved using new or emerging technologies, without addressing the root causes of the problems or changing the underlying social structures and behaviours. Technofixes exist in various domains, but they are particularly prevalent in relation to the climate crisis (geoengineering, e-everything), the agrofood system (gene editing, digitalisation) and human medicine (human 'upgrading' through high technology). However, as Leach, Scoones and Stirling (2010) have highlighted, technological fixes usually fail to address the problems they are designed to solve because the real world is more complex than the laboratories and models on which they are based – and such fixes often create new socio-environmental problems. Therefore, they are primarily a profitable business model and should not be relied upon by societies when addressing today's intricate socio-ecological crises.

Social anthropologists have found that the perception of where solutions to societal and environmental problems could be found varies greatly between socio-cultural groups, as does the perception of the risks associated with different solutions. This is because, as Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 8) emphasised, social perceptions of risk are closely linked to cultural values. 'Common values lead to common fears (and, by implication, to a common agreement not to fear other things)'. However, the worldviews and values associated with technological 'solutions' are rarely made explicit or debated, and are instead silently enacted in technological 'innovations' and 'risk management' schemes alike (see Wynne, 2002). Furthermore, as Beck (1986) pointed out, such modernist technologies and the risks associated with them are not voluntary: they are increasingly globalised and pervasive, with no option to opt out in many cases (consider pesticide residues in food and groundwater, radiation from cellular networks and collapsed nuclear power plants, for example). Technology assessments that focus narrowly on specific aspects and legally acceptable economic limits for chemicals or radiation often authorise the rollout of technologies while externalising the human and ecological costs and harm they cause (see European Environment Agency, 2002, 2013).

Against this backdrop, every discourse of risk can be understood as a problematisation characterised by powerful 'truth games' (Rabinow, 2003). These truth games are played out by political actors (such as politicians, interest groups, economic stakeholders and NGOs) under specific cultural and economic conditions, invoking particular bodies of knowledge (including scientific ones), with significant consequences for how technologies are viewed and handled (see, for example, Hajer, 1995). We therefore require a technology compass with a much broader scope that takes a deeper look at a technology’s underlying worldview, its relationship with power and its social character and effect on social fabrics, rather than the usual risk-opportunity analysis of technology assessments.

A narrow concept of marketable innovation and techno-economic projections based on notions such as 'growth' and 'progress' have for too long been used to impose capital-intensive and resource-intensive technofixes on our societies, rather than building on the available, less risky solutions and techniques that often originate from common pools or are open source and which defy further capital accumulation. As Harvey (2003a) highlighted, the two key drivers of technological 'innovations' are capitalist profit and military strength. Technofixes tend to go hand in hand with a narrow, market-based notion of innovation. They are typically large-scale, resource-intensive and high-risk enterprises, owned by a select few but imposed on the many, if not all of us, and they readily feed into cycles of accumulation by dispossession and disenfranchisement (Harvey, 2003b). We challenge these often veiled or ignored connections between technology, innovation, and capital accumulation.

A strong, yet usually unacknowledged, worldview lies behind many of the technological 'improvements' to humans and the 'control' of nature. This worldview encompasses transhumanism, which is the belief that humans are deficient by natural design and that these deficiencies can be overcome by 'smart' technologies, as well as a strong human–nature dichotomy. In this dichotomy, humans stand outside 'nature' and above all other forms of life (e.g. Bostrom, 2005; Harari, 2016). However, this same worldview of human exceptionalism and detachment from our shared earthly 'oikos' has led us to the current state of crisis (Davis, Moulton, Van Sant & Williams, 2019; Plumwood, 2002). It is also at odds with worldviews that could show us ways out of this situation, such as worldviews that reject the human–nature dichotomy and view the lives of humans and non-humans as deeply intertwined. Examples of such worldviews include convivialism, Ubuntu, and buen vivir (Acosta, 2015; Adloff & Caillé, 2022; Mignolo, 2011).

References

• Acosta, A. (2015). Buen vivir: Vom Recht auf ein gutes Leben. oekom Verlag München.
• Adloff, F., & Caillé, A. (Eds.). (2022). Convivial Futures: Views from a Post-Growth Tomorrow (1st ed.). Bielefeld, Germany: transcript Verlag. https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839456644
• Beck, U. (1986). Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
• Bostrom, N. (2005). Transhumanist values. Journal of Philosophical Research, 30, 3–14.
• Davis, J., Moulton, A. A., Van Sant, L., & Williams, B. (2019). Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene? A Manifesto for Ecological Justice in an Age of Global Crises. Geography Compass, 13(5), e12438. https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12438
• Douglas, M., & Wildavsky, A. (1982). Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers. Berkeley: University of California Press.
• European Environment Agency. (2002). Late lessons from early warnings: The precautionary principle 1896-2000. Publications Office.
• European Environment Agency. (2013). Late lessons from early warnings: Science, precaution, innovation (No. 1/2013). Copenhagen: European Environment Agency (EEA). Retrieved from European Environment Agency (EEA) website: https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2800/73322
• Hajer, M. A. (1995). The Politics of Environmental Discourse. Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Harari, Y. N. (2016). Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow. London: Harvill Secker.
• Harvey, D. (2003a). The Fetish of Technology: Causes and Consequences. Macalester International, 13(1). Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl/vol13/iss1/7
• Harvey, D. (2003b). The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Leach, M., Stirling, A. C., & Scoones, I. (2010). Dynamic sustainabilities: Technology, environment, social justice. Taylor & Francis.
• Mignolo, W. (2011). The darker side of western modernity: Global futures, decolonial options. Durham: Duke University Press.
• Morozov, E. (2013). To save everything, click here: The folly of technological solutionism. New York: Public Affairs.
• Morozov, E. (2020, April 15). The tech ‘solutions’ for coronavirus take the surveillance state to the next level. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/15/tech-coronavirus-surveilance-state-digital-disrupt
• Plumwood, V. (2002). Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason. London: Routledge. Rabinow, P. (2003). Anthropos Today. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
• Wynne, B. (2002). Risk and Environment as Legitimatory Discourses of Technology: Reflexivity Inside Out? Current Sociology, 50(3), 459–477. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392102050003010

* Solutionism “holds that because there is no alternative (or time or funding), the best we can do is to apply digital plasters to the damage. Solutionists deploy technology to avoid politics; they advocate ‘post- ideological’ measures that keep the wheels of global capitalism turning” (Morozov, 2020).